Abstract. The Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem for groups of prime order is a practical public-key cryptosystem, provably secure in the standard model under standard assumptions. This paper extends the cryptosystem for groups of unknown order, namely the group of quadratic residues modulo a composed N . Two security results are: In the standard model, the scheme is provably secure if both the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption for QR N and the factorisation assumption for N hold. In the random oracle model, the scheme is provably secure under the factorisation assumption by a quite efficient reduction.
Introduction
Security against chosen ciphertext attacks is essential for many cryptosystems. Naor and Yung [11] introduced this notion in the world of public-key cryptosystems and first described a scheme secure against non-adaptive chosen ciphertext ("lunchtime") attacks. Today, most cryptographers agree that a "good" public-key cryptosystem should be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext (ACC) attacks. 1 This notion has been introduced by Rackoff and Simon [12] . Dolev, Dwork and Naor [9] described a scheme provably secure against ACC attacks under standard assumptions. However, their scheme is too inefficient for practical applications. The research for provably secure and practically efficient cryptosystems has led to schemes provably secure in the random oracle model [2] , and to schemes provably secure under non-standard assumptions such as the "oracle Diffie-Hellman" assumption [1] .
The Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [5] is the only cryptosystem known to be both practical and provably secure under standard assumptions -mainly, the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in groups of prime order. Recently, the same authors proposed a generalisation of their cryptosystem [7] . Its security can be based either on Paillier's decision composite residiosity assumption or on the (quite classical) quadratic residiosity (QR) assumption -or on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in groups of prime order, as before. As pointed out in [7] , the QR-based variant of the generalisation is not too efficient in practice. 2 In this paper, we deal with another variation, based on the Diffie-Hellman problem in specific groups of non-prime order.
Set N = P Q, P = 2p + 1, Q = 2q + 1, p = q, and let P , Q, p, and q be odd primes. In the remainder of this paper, we assume N to be of that form.
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) can be seen as the secret-key part of a hybrid cryptosystem. Combining a KEM with an appropriate secret-key cryptosystem provides the functionality of a public-key cryptosystem. If the secretkey cryptosystem satisfies some fairly standard security assumptions and the KEM is secure against ACC attacks, the public-key cryptosystem is secure against ACC attacks as well. (This is called a "folk theorem" in [13] . See also [6] .) A KEM is a triple (Gen, KE, KD) of algorithms:
1. A key pair generation algorithm Gen, which, given a security parameter, randomly chooses a public-key/secret-key pair (PK,SK). 2. A randomised key encapsulation algorithm KE to choose (C, K)=KE(PK),
i.e. a ciphertext C and an encapsulated key K. 3. A deterministic key decapsulation algorithm KD to compute K =KD(SK,C), and to reject invalid ciphertexts.
A KEM is sound, if K = K for any (PK,SK)=Gen(·), (C, K)=KE(PK), and K =KD(SK,C). The KEM presented in Section 4 and its extension in Section 7 are both sound. Proving this is easy, but omitted here for the sake of space.
An ACC attack against a KEM (Gen, KE, KD) can be described by the following game:
1. A key generation oracle computes (PK,SK)=Gen(·) and publishes PK. 2. A key encapsulation oracle chooses (C, K)=KE(PK) and σ ∈ R {0, 1}. If σ = 0, the oracle sends (C, K) to the adversary, else (C, K ) with K ∈ R {0, 1} |K| . 3. The adversary makes some queries C 1 , . . . , C q to a key decapsulation oracle, with C i = C. For each query C i , the oracle responds the value KD(SK,C i ), which may be either a bit string, or a special code to indicate rejection. For i ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1}, the adversary learns the response KD(SK,C i ), before she has to choose the next query C i+1 . 4. The adversary outputs a value σ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary's advantage in guessing σ is the difference
of conditional probabilities. A KEM is secure against ACC attacks, or ACCsecure if, for all efficient adversaries, the advantage is negligible.
In Section B of the appendix, we compare ACC-secure KEMs with ACCsecure public-key cryptosystems and introduce lunchtime-security.
The Cryptosystem and some Assumptions
Here, we deal with the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem and what assumptions we make to prove its security. Cramer and Shoup [5] considered groups G of (known) prime order q * , while we consider the group QR N of composed order pq. There is no need to actually know pq, not even for the owner of the secret key. (Note that knowing pq makes factorising N easy.) For the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to describing the system as a key encapsulation mechanism, instead of a full scale public-key cryptosystem.
Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem in the group QR N : -Key Generation Gen(l):
• Generate N , P , Q, p, q as above with 2 l−1 < N < 2 l . Choose a generator g for QR N . • Choose a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z Z m (with m ≤ pq).
• Randomly choose w ∈ R Z Z pq , and compute g 2 = g w . Choose x 1 , x 2 , y 1 ,
, and e = g z .
• The public key is PK= (N , g, H, g 2 , c, d, e) .
The secret key is SK=(
• The ciphertext is (u 1 , u 2 , t), the encapsulated key is k.
Both in a group G of prime order and in composed order groups (such as QR N and Z Z * N ), expressions such as g a * g b and (g a ) b are equivalent to g a+b and g ab . For prime order groups "a + b" and "ab" are addition and multiplication in a field, but for general groups G these operations are defined in the ring Z Z |G| . Thus, the proof of security from [5] is not directly applicable to the cryptosystem proposed in the current paper, though our proof is along the same lines.
Assumption: (Target collision resistance of H) Let F H be a family of hash functions {0, 1} * → Z Z m , for m ≤ pq. Consider the following experiment:
1. Fix an input T for H (the "target").
2.
Randomly choose H from the family F H . It is infeasible to find a "collision" for the target T , i.e., an input T = T such that H(T ) = H(T ). As a minor abuse of notation, we write "H is target collision resistant" ("TCresistant") to indicate that H has has been chosen from such a family F H .
Assumption: (decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption for QR N ) Let a generator g for QR N be given. Consider the distributions R of triples
It is infeasible to distinguish between R and D. 4 Assumption: (computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption for QR N ) Let a generator g for QR N be given. Given two values g 2 ∈ R QR N and u 1 ∈ R QR N with log g (u 1 ) = r, it is infeasible to find the value u 2 = g r 2 . 5 3 We don't care if T ∈ QR N , because T ∈ QR N , and the test "T = T " is supposed to fail if T ∈ QR N . Remark 3 describes how to enforce U1, U2 ∈ QR N . 4 An alternative view would be to consider two distributions D4 and R4 of quadruples (g, g2, u1, u2) . The distribution of g is the same for D4 and R4, and g is a generator.
Apart from that, we don't specify how g is actually chosen. The values g2, u1 and u2 are either chosen according to D, or according to R. 5 Since g ∈ QR N is a generator, log g (x) is uniquely defined for x ∈ QR N . Assumption: (factoring assumption for N ) Given N , it its infeasible to find P or Q.
Theorem 1 (Factoring assumption ⇒ CDH assumption).
If the factoring N is infeasible, the CDH assumption for QR N holds.
The proof is in Section C of the appendix.
Some Technicalities
Lemma 5. Let g be a generator of QR N and w ∈ R Z Z pq . The value g 2 = g w is a uniformly distributed random value in QR N . With overwhelming probability, g 2 is a generator for QR N .
Proof. Clearly, g 2 is uniformly distributed. By Lemma 4, g 2 is a generator for QR N ⇔ w ∈ Z Z * pq . Hence, pr[g 2 is a generator for QR N ] = (p − 1)(q − 1)/pq. Lemma 6. If it is feasible to find any pair (α, β) ∈ Z Z pq with (α − β) ∈ Z Z pq − Z Z * pq − {0}, it is feasible to factorise N . Proof. Let g be a generator for QR N . If (α − β) ∈ Z Z pq − Z Z * pq − {0}, then ord(g α−β ) ∈ {p, q} and thus, we can compute gcd(g α−β − 1, N ) ∈ {P, Q}.
Lemma 7. Let g be a generator for QR N and g 2 ∈ R QR N . If it is feasible to choose
, and (r 2 − r 1 ) ∈ Z Z pq − Z Z * pq − {0}, it is feasible to factorise N .
Proof. Choose g 2 as suggested in Lemma 5:
) ∈ {p, q}, and thus gcd(g and thus factorise N . Now we describe a simulator for the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem. Its purpose is not to be actually used for key encapsulation and decapsulation, but as a technical tool for the proof of security. If an adversary mounts an attack against the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, the simulator may provide the responses, instead of an "honest" Cramer-Shoup oracle. Note that the adversary can make many key decapsulation queries, but only one single key encapsulation query.
A Simulator for the Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem in QR N : -Generate the public key:
• Let the values g, N and H and a triple (
, and
. 6 The public key is PK=(N , g, H, g 2 , c, d, e).
-Key Encapsulation KE(PK):
-Key Decapsulation KD(SK,(U 1 , U 2 , T )):
A Proof of Security in the Standard Model
In this section, we prove the security of the Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem in QR N in the standard model. The proof is based on three lemmas.
Theorem 2 (Security in the standard model).
If H is TC-resistant and both the DDH assumption for QR N and the factoring assumption for N hold, the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem in QR N is ACC-secure.
Lemma 8. If the triple (g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) given to the simulator is distributed according to distribution D, an adversary cannot statistically distinguish between the behavior of the simulator and the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem itself.
Proof. If (g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) is distributed according to D, a value r exists such that u 1 = g r and u 2 = g r 2 . We show that the simulator's responses are statistically indistinguishable from the real cryptosystem's responses.
Consider the key encapsulation query. The simulator computes
The distribution of the response ((g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ), k) is identical to the distribution of the cryptosystem's response. Now consider the key decapsulation queries. If a query (U 1 , U 2 , T ) is valid, i.e., if a value R ∈ Z Z pq exists with U 1 = g R and U 2 = g R 2 , the simulator's response is the same as the response the cryptosystem provides. Both the simulator and the cryptosystem reject (
, and else output
2 ) R = e R . It remains to show that both the cryptosystem and the simulator (given (g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) distributed according to D) reject all invalid key decapsulation queries with overwhelming probability -and thus essentially behave identically.
The decision to reject an invalid ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T ) depends on four random values x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ Z Z pq . A part of the public key are the values c and d with c = g
(1)
These equations 7 provide public information about the quadruple (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) of secret values. The response to the encapsulation query provides another equation log g (t) = rx 1 + ry 1 α + rwx 2 + rwy 2 α, however log g (t) = rl c + rl d α, i.e., this new equation linearly depends on Equations 1 and 2, and thus provides no new information about (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ). This still leaves (pq) 2 possibilities for the quadruple (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ). Assume g 2 to be a generator for QR N . (By Lemma 5, this is overwhelmingly probable.) Let the ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T ) be invalid. Thus, R 1 = R 2 exist with 7 It is vital that lc and l d are uniquely defined. We need not actually compute lc or l d .
. To answer the query, the values
are computed, which provides the equation
Equations 1 and 2 can be used to eliminate the variables x 1 and y 1 :
By Lemma 5 and Lemma 7 we know that with overwhelming probability and under the factoring assumption both w and (R 2 − R 1 ) are invertible mod pq. If these two values are invertible, we may fix the value y 2 arbitrarily and there always exists a uniquely defined value
to prevent the rejection of the invalid ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T ). Each time an invalid ciphertext is rejected, this eliminates at most pq of the (pq) 2 possible quadruples (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ).
N given to the simulator is distributed according to distribution R, the simulator rejects all invalid ciphertexts with overwhelming probability.
Proof. Recall that the rejection of an invalid ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T ) depends on the quadruple (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ QR N of secret values, and that the public key provides the two linear Equations 1 and 2 to narrow down the number of possibilities for (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ) to (pq) 2 . The response to the encapsulation query provides the value t = u
and thus a linear equation
By using Equations 1 and 2, we can eliminate the variables x 1 and y 1 :
An invalid ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T ) is rejected, except when Equation 3 holds, which means T = T . Recall α = H(u 1 , u 2 ) and A = H(U 1 , U 2 ) and consider three cases:
By the definition of an ACC attack, we require t = T , and thus the key decapsulation query (U 1 , U 2 , T ) will be rejected. -Case 2, (U 1 , U 2 ) = (u 1 , u 2 ) and α = A : This is a collision for H for the target (u 1 , u 2 ), which contradicts the assumption for H to be TC-resistant.
-Case 3: (U 1 , U 2 ) = (u 1 , u 2 ) and α = A : We have four unknowns x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ QR N , and four Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 describe their relationship. By solving this system of linear equations we get
which uniquely determines y 2 if all the four values (r 2 − r 1 ), (R 2 − R 1 ), w, and (A − α) are invertible in Z Z pq . 8 The invertibility of (r 2 − r 1 ) and (R 2 − R 1 ) follows from Lemma 7, the invertibility of w follows from Lemma 5, and the invertibility of (A − α) follows from Lemma 6.
Lemma 10. Let k be the encapsulated key in the response for the encapsulation query. If the triple (g 2 , u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ QR 3 N given to the simulator is distributed according to distribution R, it is infeasible for the adversary to distinguish between k and a uniformly distributed random value.
Proof. We set r 1 = log g (u 1 ) and r 2 = log g 2 (u 2 ). Assume that g 2 = g w is a generator for QR N and that r 1 = r 2 . Both assumptions hold with overwhelming probability. Now we prove: If all invalid decapsulation queries are rejected during the simulation, then under the factoring assumption it is infeasible for the adversary to distinguish between k and a random value.
Observe that k only depends on the two random values
, the public key provides one linear equation
The rejection of an invalid key decapsulation query does not depend on z 1 and z 2 . If the decapsulation query (U 1 , U 2 , T ) is valid and not rejected, we have a value R such that U 1 = g R and U 2 = g R 2 . By log g (k) = Rz 1 + Rwz 2 = R log g (e) this provides another equation, linearly depending on Equation 5 . The response for the key encapsulation query consists of a ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , t) and a key k = u z 1 1 u z 2 2 = g r 1 z 1 g wr 2 z 2 , which provides a linear equation l k := log g (k) = r 1 z 1 + wr 2 z 2 = r 1 l e − r 1 wz 2 + r 2 wz 2 = r 1 l e + wz 2 (r 2 − r 1 ), (6) which finally gives
As before, we argue that with overwhelming probability and under the factoring assumption both w and (r 2 − r 1 ) are invertible in Z Z pq . If w and (r 2 − r 1 ) are invertible, then a unique value z 2 exists for every key k ∈ QR N .
Proof (Theorem 2)
. If the adversary can break the cryptosystem by distinguishing a real encapsulated key from a random one, she can do so as well in the simulation, if the simulator input is chosen according to distribution D (Lemma 8). Since she cannot distinguish a real key from a random key in the simulation if the simulator input is distributed according to R (Lemmas 9 and 10), being able to break the cryptosystem means being able to distinguish distribution D from distribution R, contradicting the DDH assumption for QR N .
Remark 1 (Strengthening Theorem 2 by avoiding the factoring assumption).
If H is TC-resistant and the DDH assumption for QR N holds, the CramerShoup Cryptosystem in QR N is ACC-secure.
To verify this, assume that the adversary somehow learns the factors P and Q of N . Then the DDH-problem for QR N is hard if and only if both the DDH problem for QR P and the DDH problem for QR Q are hard. But given P and Q and an oracle to mount an ACC-attack against the Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem for QR N , we can use this oracle to solve the DDH problem for either QR P or QR Q . In this case, the DDH problem for QR N is feasible.
An Extension and its Security
We describe how to extend the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, dealing with a hash function h, which may be used like a random oracle (→ Figure 1 ):
The Extended Scheme and its Abstract Security
Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem in QR N with h-extension:
-The key pair (PK, SK) is the same as for the non-extended Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem. Let h be a function h : {1, 2, 3} × QR 3 N → QR N . -Extend key encapsulation by computing t * = t * h(1, k, u 1 , u 2 ) (→ solid arrows in Figure 1 ) and τ = t * h(2, k, u 1 , u 2 ) and k * = k * h(3, τ, u 1 , u 2 ) (→ dashed arrows). The ciphertext is (u 1 , u 2 , t * ), the encapsulated key is k * . -Decapsulate the ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T * ) ∈ QR 2 N × Z Z * N by computing K , T as before, and reject if T * h(1, K , U 1 , U 2 ) = T * . Else compute τ = T * h(2, K , U 1 , U 2 ) and output K * = K * h(3, τ , U 1 , U 2 ). * * * Fig. 1 . The h-extension: converting t and k into t * and k * .
Theorem 3 (Security of h-extended scheme in standard model).
Let h be any efficient function h : {1, 2, 3}×QR
Proof. Observe that the simulator described in Section 5 computes the values k and t when dealing with an encapsulation query. Also, being asked to decapsulate the ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T ), the same simulator computes the values K and T from U 1 and U 2 . Thus, it is straightforward to apply the h-extension to the simulator. Since h is efficient, the extended simulator is efficient, too.
Using the extended simulator instead of the original one, the proof for Theorem 2 is applicable to Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 (Security of h-extended scheme in random oracle model).
If the function h is modeled as a random oracle, the h-extended scheme is ACCsecure under the factoring assumption. Proof. Let N and H be given. Consider an adversary with a non-negligible advantage to win the attack game. In the following experiment, we modify the key generation and we describe how to respond to the adversary's oracle queries, including queries to the random oracle. We start with the key generation:
-Choose β ∈ R {1, . . . , N/4 − 1}, α ∈ R Z Z * N and compute e := α 2 .
-Choose u 1 ∈ R QR N and compute g := u 2β 1 . (We will search for k = e log g (u 1 ) , i.e., for the value k with k 2β = e. If we find k, we have a 50 % chance that gcd(k β − α, N ) ∈ {P, Q} holds, providing us with the factorisation of N .) -Choose w ∈ R Z Z pq and compute g 2 = g w and u 2 = u w 1 . -Choose x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ R Z Z pq and compute c = g x 1 g The response to the key encapsulation query is the ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , t * ) and the encapsulated key k * with t * , k * ∈ R QR N .
Let (U 1 , U 2 , T * ) be a key decapsulation query. We respond as follows:
-Consider values K with queries for δ 1 = h(1, K , U 1 , U 2 ) to the random oracle. Verify, if for one such value K the equation
holds. If not, or if T * = T * δ 1 , then reject. -Else ask the random oracle for δ 2 = h(2, K , U 1 , U 2 ), compute τ = T * δ 2 , ask for δ 3 = h(3, τ, U 1 , U 2 ), and respond K * = K * δ 3 to the adversary.
A random oracle query to compute h(I, X, U 1 , U 2 ) (with I ∈ {1, 2, 3} and X, U 1 , U 2 ∈ QR N ) may be asked either by the adversary, or by ourselves when answering a key decapsulation query. The answer is computed as follows:
1. If we have been asked for h(I, X, U 1 , U 2 ) before, repeat the same answer. 2. Else, if I ∈ {1, 2}, u 1 = U 1 , u 2 = U 2 , and X 2β = e, print X and abort.
3. Else choose Y ∈ R QR N and respond Y .
Observe that if we never abort (→ Step 2), the adversary cannot distinguish h from a random function over the same domain. On the other hand, assume that we abort the experiment, having found a value X with X 2β = e, i.e., a square root (mod N ) of e. Initially, we know two square roots of e, namely ±α. Since the adversary has no information about α, except for e = α 2 , X β = ±α holds with probability 1/2. In this case, we can factorise N by computing gcd(X β −α, N ) ∈ {P, Q}. This shows: If π is the probability to abort the experiment, we can factorise N with the probability π/2 after running the experiment once. Now, we deal with three different games:
1. The attack game with the "real" encapsulated key k * , 2. the attack game where k * is replaced by a random value, and 3. the experiment we defined for the current proof.
As it turns out, the adversary cannot distinguish the experiment from either of the attack games, except when we abort the experiment:
-The public key values g, g 2 , c, d, and e are independent uniformly distributed random values in QR N -in the attack games, as in the experiment. -In the attack games, the values u 1 and u 2 from the encapsulation query satisfy the equation
, with u 1 ∈ R QR N . For one of the attack games, the values t * and k * depend on t and k (and h), while for the other one, t * depends on t and k, while k * is chosen at random. In the experiment, u 1 ∈ R QR N and u 2 = g log g (u 1 ) 2 as well. The value t * cannot be distinguished from a uniformly distributed random value without asking for h(1, k, u 1 , u 2 ) (and then aborting). The value k * cannot be distinguished without asking for h(3, τ, u 1 , u 2 ). Asking this query is infeasible without having asked for δ 2 = h(2, k, u 1 , u 2 ) (followed by an abortion), since τ depends on δ 2 .
-Consider a decapsulation query (U 1 , U 2 , T * ). Let K be defined by Equation 7. If h is a well-defined function, there is a unique well defined value T * such that a ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T * ) has to be accepted, and every ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T * ) with T * = T * has to be rejected. Without asking for h(1, K , U 1 , U 2 ), the adversary cannot predict T * , and any ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T * ) chosen by the adversary is rejected with overwhelming probability in the attack games and with probability 1 in the experiment. If the adversary had asked for h(1, K , U 1 , U 2 ), the computation of T * and K * is exactly the same in the experiment as in the attack games.
The Concrete Security of the Extended Scheme
Note that the reduction in the proof of Theorem 4 is very efficient. We quantify this by describing the concrete security against a generic adversary, i.e., against an adversary who treats the hash function h like a random oracle.
Theorem 5 (Concrete security of h-extended scheme in r. o. model).
Let A be a generic ACC adversary, allowed to ask one key encapsulation query, q kd key decapsulation queries, and q 1 + q 2 + q 3 random oracle queries, namely q i random oracle queries of the form h(i, . . .). Assume A takes the running time T A and achieves the advantage a A when distinguishing between the attack game with the "real" and the attack game with a random encapsulated key. Then an algorithm F exists to find the factors P and Q of N with at least the probability a A /2 − (q 3 + 2q kd )/pq. The expected running time for F is at most T A + T δ , with T δ being linear in the total number q Σ = (1 + q kd + q 1 + q 2 + q 3 ) of oracle queries. More specifically, T δ is the time for doing 7 + 3q kd + q 1 + q 2 exponentiations mod N and O(q Σ ) other operations.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 already describes what we call algorithm F, here: Run the key generation and then invoke the distinguishing adversary A, providing all responses to A's oracle queries. To prove Theorem 5, we concretely analyse running time and probability of success of this algorithm.
Running time:
During key generation, we compute seven values by exponentiation mod N :
. When responding to the key encapsulation query, no exponentiations are necessary. Responding to a random oracle query h(1, . . .) or h(2, . . .) may require to compute X 2β . Queries h(3, . . .) can be answered without computing any exponentiations.
Key decapsulation queries are slightly more complicated and may need up to three exponentiations. Two are needed to to compute T . The values (K ) 2β have already been computed when dealing with a random oracle query h(1, . . .) and may have been stored in a table. But responding to a key decapsulation query may require to make two additional calls h(2, . . .) and h(3, . . .) to the random oracle, and calling h(2, . . .) may require another (third) exponentiation.
Thus the total number of exponentiations mod N is at most
Similarly, we can count the total number of other operations, which is no more than linear in q Σ , as well.
Note that the random oracle may have to respond to at most q 1 queries h(1, . . .), but to at most q kd + q 2 queries h(2, . . .) and q kd + q 3 queries h(3, . . .). The reason is, that computing the answer to a decapsulation query may include two additional random oracle queries h(2, . . .) and h(3, . . .).
Probability:
A cannot distinguish between the two attack games without asking for h(3, τ, u 1 , u 2 ), where τ = h(2, k, u 1 , u 2 ) * t. If A ever asks for h(2, k, u 1 , u 2 ), the simulator aborts and F will factorise N with a 50 % probability of success. Else, A has no (Shannon-) information about τ . In this case, and since at most q 3 + q kd queries of the form h(3, . . .) are to be answered, the probability that any of these is of the form h(3, τ, u 1 , u 2 ) is at most (q 3 + q kd )/pq. When might the adversary be able to distinguish either of the attack games from the experiment we define in the proof of Theorem 4, i.e., from the behavior of algorithm F? The experiment behaves exactly like any of the attack games, with the following two exceptions:
1. A asks for h(I, X, U 1 , U 2 ) with I ∈ {1, 2} and X 2β = e. In this case, the experiment is aborted (and F has a 50 % chance of factorising N ).
2.
A asks for the decapsulation of a ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T * ), without having asked for h(1, K , U 1 , U 2 ) before (K defined in Equation (7)). In this case, F always rejects, while the attack games reject with the probability 1/pq.
Since A can ask for the decapsulation of q kd ciphertext, the entire probability that any random ciphertext is not rejected in an attack game is ≤ q kd /pq. Even if A could always distinguish the "real" encapsulated key from a random value when asking for h(3, τ, u 1 , u 2 ) without asking for h(2, k, u 1 , u 2 ) before, or when a random ciphertext (U 1 , U 2 , T * ) in a key decapsulation query is not rejected, the probability for F to factorise N would not be less than
Remark 2 (Practical consequences of Theorem 5).
Theorem 5 counts modular exponentiations and mentions "other operations". These are simpler arithmetic operations (e.g. multiplication mod N ), choosing random values (∈ R QR N , ∈ R Z Z * N , and ∈ R Z Z pq ), and hash table look-up and update operations. In practice, none of these operations should be slower than an exponentiation mod N . Thus, the running time for algorithm F is T A + O(q Σ * T N ), where T N is the time for computing an exponentiation mod N . For any reasonable choice of N , the probability that F actually factorises N is extremely close to a A /2.
Comparison to Shoup's technique
The approach in this section has been inspired by Shoup [13] , who also described a "hedged" variant of the Cramer-Shoup Scheme, being both -provably secure in the standard model under a "strong" assumption and -provably secure in the random oracle model under a "weak" assumption.
In [13] the "strong" assumption is the DDH assumption for a group G of prime order. The "weak" assumption is the CDH assumption for G. As was stressed in [6] (see also [13, Remark 4] ), the reduction in the random oracle model is quite inefficient, since it is relative to a DDH oracle:
-Let the DDH assumption for G be false. I.e., a polynomial-time algorithm A 1 with a significant DDH advantage exists. By standard amplification techniques (calling A 1 polynomially often), we get A 2 , which achieves an overwhelming DDH advantage. Note that the DDH-oracle A 2 is "efficient" in the sense of Complexity Theory, but may be quite inefficient in practice.
Assume an efficient generic ACC adversary A exists to break the hedged Cramer-Shoup variant [13] . The reduction in [13] describes how to use the adversary A as a tool to break the CDH assumption for G. The reduction requires to call A 2 each time when A asks a new random oracle query.
-Consider a hypothetical example (using viciously chosen numbers): Let, for some choice of G, A 1 run in 2 30 computer clocks. Thus, A 1 could qualify as "practically efficient". If A 2 executes A 1 2 30 times, A 2 could be considered "hard, but feasible" on a massively parallel computer. Now consider an efficient generic ACC adversary A making 2 30 random oracle queries. The reduction provides an algorithm to solve the CDH problem for G, but this algorithm would require more than 2 90 units of time.
Thus, an efficient generic ACC attack against the scheme does not necessarily reduce to a practical solution for the CDH problem for G.
As explained above, the reduction in the current paper is quite efficient, using linearly many moderately simple operations (such as exponentiations mod N ), but no potentially complex operation (such as the DDH oracle in [13] ).
Also note that we do not assume the hash function H to be TC-resistant, for Theorem 4, in contrast to [13, Theorem 3] .
On the other hand, the random oracle security in the current paper is based on the factoring assumption, not on the CDH assumption. This may be seen as a disadvantage. By generalising the technique from [13] for QR N , we might be able to use the CDH assumption for QR N instead, which is at least as strong as the factoring assumption for N , see Theorem 1.
A rather technical difference to our approach is that [13] introduces the notion of a pair-wise independent hash function (PIH) and combines a PIH with a random oracle. The PIH is required for the security result in the standard model (i.e., for the counterpart of Theorem 3 in the current paper).
Final Remarks and Discussion
Remark 3 (The input for KD). Note that the input (U 1 , U 2 , T * ) ∈ QR 2 N × Z Z * N is under control of the adversary. If x is a number, it is easy to verify whether x ∈ Z Z * N , but it may be difficult to verify x ∈ QR N . We can deal with this problem by using KE' and KD' instead of KE and KD: -KE': Compute KE and replace k by k 2 and t by t 2 .
. Note that (Gen,KE',KD') is as sound as (Gen,KE,KD). But for (U 1 , U 2 , T ) ∈ (Z Z * N ) 3 , the input for KD is now in QR 2 N ×Z Z * N , as it should. A similar technique can be used for the h-extension.
Remark 4 (The hash function H).
Theoretically we don't need an additional assumption for the TC-resistance of H. Based on the factoring assumption, provably secure TC-resistant (and even stronger) hash functions are known. In practice, we may prefer to use a dedicated hash function such as SHA-1 or RIPE-MD 160.
Recall that we deal with a cryptosystem which has computations in QR N , but nobody knows (or needs to know) the order of QR N . (Note that knowing the order of QR N is equivalent to knowing the factors of N .) This may be interesting for the construction of advanced cryptographic protocols, where some party knows the factorisation of N in addition to the secret key, while another party only knows the secret key itself. E.g., consider a variant of our scheme, where the factors of N (possibly more than just two, in contrast to the current paper) are small enough that computing the discrete log modulo any of the factors is feasible. Everyone knowing the factorisation of N can thus compute discrete logarithms mod N , and the factorisation of N may serve as a "master key": Knowing it allows to compute the secret key from a given public key defined over the group QR N . This approach is roughly related to key insulation [8] , where "ordinary" public keys may be stored and used in a risky environment, while the master key is well protected.
From a practical point of view, it may not appear too useful to hide the order of the group from the owner of the secret key (except in the context of the advanced protocols mentioned above). In practice, the owner of the secret key might want to use the knowledge of the factors P and Q of N to improve the efficiency of key decapsulation by applying the Chinese Remaindering Theorem.
The main practical selling point for the current scheme is the improved security assurance in the random oracle model, compared to [13] .
An interesting open problem is the following: Is this paper's hedging technique (cf. Figure 1) applicable to other cryptosystems, e.g., to the variants of the Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem described in [7] ?
Proof. If x ≡ p (mod pq), then g qx = 1 and thus ord(g x ) = q. If ord(g x ) = q, then (g x ) p = 1 ⇒ xp ≡ 0 mod pq ⇒ x ≡ p (mod pq). Thus, x ≡ p (mod pq) ⇔ ord(g x ) = q. Similarly, we get x ≡ q (mod pq) ⇔ ord(g x ) = p.
B ACC-Security and Lunchtime-Security
Key decapsulation queries correspond to chosen ciphertext decryption queries in the public-key (PK) world. The key encapsulation query corresponds to the PK encryption query. Here, a plaintext is chosen by the adversary, the oracle either really encrypts that plaintext or it encrypts a random plaintext, and the adversary has to distinguish between real and random. Lunchtime (i.e. non-adaptive) security deals with all decryption queries before the encryption query. ACC attacks against PK cryptosystems deal with two phases of chosen ciphertext queries, the first before the encryption query, the second after the encryption query. (As mentioned in Footnote 1, some authors denote lunchtime security by "IND-CCA1" and ACC security by "IND-CCA2". Here "IND" means "indistinguishable". This notation has been introduced in [3] .) In the second phase, one may not ask for the decryption of the result of the encryption query.
A definition for a lunchtime-secure KEM would require a minor modification of our definition for an ACC-secure KEM by asking the decapsulation queries before the encapsulation query. And a two-phase attack against a KEM with some decapsulation queries before and some after the encapsulation querysimilar to the ACC attack against PK cryptosystems -can easily be simulated by our (one-phase) ACC attack.
C The Proof for Factoring assumption ⇒ CDH assumption
Proof (Theorem 1). We describe an algorithm using a CDH oracle for QR N as a tool to factorise N . For random inputs, the oracle succeeds with probability π.
-Choose β ∈ R Z Z pq , α ∈ R Z Z * N and compute g 2 = α 2 .
-Choose u 1 ∈ R QR N and compute g = u 2β
1 .
-Use the CDH oracle to compute u 2 with u Since β ∈ Z Z pq is a uniformly distributed random value (or statistically indistinguishable from uniform) so are the values g, g 2 , u 2 ∈ QR N . With the probability π, we get a random square root u β 2 of g 2 . Two of the four square roots of g 2 , namely ±α are not useful, but if α ≡ ±u β 2 (mod N ), then gcd(u β 2 − α, N ) ∈ {P, Q} factorises N .
